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Executive summary 
The reversal in the trend of productivity growth between the US and the UK on 
one side, and the main countries of continental Europe on the other, appears 
with great evidence from the data. The current debate focuses on differences in 
labour market performance, which should account for the growth and 
productivity divergence. While some measures aimed at increasing the 
participation and employment rates in the EU are certainly desirable, excessive 
precariousness of the labour market would have deep social implications, and 
should be subject to democratic approval. 
Furthermore, one striking aspect of the debate on productivity growth is the 
moderate emphasis given to investment and capital accumulation. By looking 
back to the late 1960s, one can observe a striking positive correlation between 
productivity growth and both private and public investment. If we consider the 
inherently long term features of investment, the data also show a positive 
correlation between investment and trend growth (the OECD measure for 
potential growth). 
The correlation between investment, productivity, and potential growth, should 
be better understood and investigated than what is done in the current debate. 
By doing that, we should also reassess policy in terms of its capacity to provide 
a favourable environment for capital accumulation. In this respect, the self 
complacency of policy makers in the EU may appear excessive. The Stability 
and Growth Pact has seriously affected the capacity of large European 
countries to invest (the comparison with the golden rule of the UK is in this 
respect telling), and when assessed with respect to the growth performance of 
the Euro zone, the monetary policy of the ECB seems less accommodating than 
usually believed. Excessive interest rates may contribute to explain investment 
stagnation in the past decade, especially when seen in comparison with the US 
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Introduction 
In the past decade, the growth rate of productivity and of GDP in the Euro zone 
have lagged behind the ones of the US. This is a recent phenomenon, though, because most 
of the post-war period has been characterized by a catching up of productivity and income 
by the European countries. Figure 1 shows a general measure of productivity -Real GDP 
over employment- , for the US and for the largest countries of the European Union1. We 
can observe that the productivity of the US was substantially larger than all European 
countries in 1965. Figure 2 shows the yearly percentage increases in the two sub periods 
1965-1990 and 1992-2005, emphasizing the change that happened in the last decade. 
 
We can notice that while the US is the only country that experienced an increase in 
the growth rate of productivity (almost doubled), all the European countries experienced a 
reduction, particularly sharp for the countries like Spain and Italy, that because of their 
initial backwardness, had progressed most in the preceding decades. It is also worth 
mentioning that while decreasing, the growth rate of productivity in the UK remained 
slightly larger than in the US. In fact, relative to the early 1990s, the UK has the most 
productive economy of our sample. 
 
The Causes of the Anglo-Saxon Predominance 
The current debate on growth and productivity only focuses on the latest period, 
and it revolves around the question of how the European countries can get out of their ‘soft 
growth trap’. The ECB (e.g., the October 2006 Bulletin) summarizes the debate by 
identifying a number of factors that can explain why the US and the UK grow faster than 
the larger continental economies, and experience higher productivity growth. The elements 
that are evoked are well known in the literature:2 
a) A substantially larger (almost 10 percentage points) employment rate in 
the US 
b) Longer hours worked in the US. This has triggered a debate, not settled 
yet, on whether the difference in labour supply depends on a different 
                                                 
1 I normalized at 1992=100 for essentially two reasons. First, to mark the structural break that appears in 
the early 1990s (in particular with the Maastricht Treaty). Second, to partially neutralize the discontinuity in 
the data introduced by the German reunification. A more careful assessment of the German data also justify 
my choice below to eliminate the year 1991 from my subsamples. 
2 See e.g. How to Elevate the potential growth rate of Europe, speech by Jean-Claude Trichet, President 
of the ECB, Berlin 16 October 2006. 
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preference for leisure, or on different revenue incentives (i.e., excessive 
tax burden in the European countries). 
c) The US experienced a larger (around twice as much) investment in ICT 
than Europe. ICT is widely recognized as a major determinant of recent 
productivity growth. 
The third element, in particular, may help to explain why the increase of 
employment has not triggered a slowdown of productivity growth in the US. 
This diagnosis is robustly supported by data, and largely shareable. What is less 
convincing is the recommended therapy, which focuses exclusively on the effort to make 
product and (mainly) labour markets more flexible. 
Some of the currently debated measures are certainly necessary and useful, and 
their implementation only depends on the overall impact on public finances. It is for 
example the case of a reduction in the tax wedge. Other measures, nevertheless, - like the 
incentives for part time or the reduction of labour protection – need to be carefully 
weighed. For these measures, the increased flexibility of the labour market may come at 
the price of an increased precariousness of labour, a result that would change the 
organization of our society, and as such needs to be the explicit outcome of a democratic 
and political process rather than a technocratic choice. Furthermore, the future costs for 
social security would need to be carefully evaluated, as precariousness would most 
probably be associated with lower capacity to provide social contributions. 
To sum up, the effort to make the labour markets more flexible has to be 
encouraged, but carefully drafted in order to avoid a deep modification of our societies, 
that would be unwarranted unless explicitly subject to a democratic choice. 
 
Investment and Productivity 
Two things in the debate about productivity appear puzzling; the first is the already 
mentioned exclusive focus on the recent comparison between the US and European 
countries. The second is the secondary importance attributed to the role of investment, 
which is often mentioned but never really studied, especially in what concern the positive 
implications of economic policy. The minor role attributed to investment is particularly at 
odd with the emphasis that economic theory (even at the textbook level) puts on the link 
between capital accumulation, productivity and potential growth. 
These two odd features of the debate are deeply intertwined, because by extending 
the comparison to the decades preceding 1990, the explanatory power of institutional 
labour market differences fades away. The US was already relatively more flexible, but its 
productivity performance at the time was lower than the European’s. It is then necessary to 
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go back to the role of investment, to make sense of the differences in growth and 
productivity. Figures 3 and 4 show the yearly average increase in capital stock, for the 
private and public sector respectively, divided once again in the two sub samples 1965-
1990 and 1992-20053. 
The first one shows that European countries experienced much larger private 
investment than the US in the previous sub period. In the second period, nevertheless, in 
the framework of a generalized drop of investment rates, the US and the UK limited the 
reduction; in the past 15 years, their average private net investment rate was larger than the 
one of Germany and Italy. Figure 4 shows the average rate of Government Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation. The similarity with figure 2 is in fact quite striking, as the only 
countries that experienced an increase in public investment, since 2002 (the US and the 
UK), are also the ones that increased most their productivity. It is worth mentioning that 
steep decrease in public investment for European countries coincides with the run up to the 
Euro, which in many countries implied a tightening of monetary and  fiscal policy. As was 
to be expected, this tightening hit harder expenditure items like investment, which were 
less “visible”, without significantly affecting politically sensitive items like current 
spending. With this in mind, the dramatic increase of public investment in the United 
Kingdom becomes an indirect proof of the appropriateness of the golden rule of public 
finances, which regulates public expenditure net of investment. In the UK the soundness of 
public finances was assured without harming investment, and hence guaranteeing the 
continuing increase of productivity and potential output. By contrast, the countries subject 
to the strict constraints of the Maastricht Treaty, and then of the Stability and Growth Pact, 
seem to have relied on drastic reductions in the rate of increase of public investment, that 
may help to explain the stagnation in productivity growth. 
 The relationship between investment and productivity can be summarized as in 
figure 5, where the increase in productivity is mapped against investment (each country has 
two points per series, corresponding to the two sub-periods). It can be seen that the 
relationship is positive for both private and public investment. 
 
Investment and Potential Output. 
Investment is a both a short and long run phenomenon. The short run effect on 
aggregate demand is well known. But an equally important role of investment is that it 
builds the future capital stock of the economy. It is through this channel, if any, that it has 
                                                 
3 Because of data availability, we were able to obtain net investment for the private sector, but gross 
investment for the public sector (for which the OECD does not provide data on the capital stock). 
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effects on the long run potential of the economy.  But these effects are by definition 
delayed, as investment takes time to become productive capital.  To emphasize the long 
run features of investment I first took five years averages (1960-65, 1965-70, and so on). 
Then I plotted them against potential output growth (as calculated by the OECD), in the 
following period, in order to capture the delayed effect of capacity construction building. I 
added Japan to the six other countries, because of its long stagnation. Figures 7 and 8 plot 
the correlation, for the total of the countries, and for each of them separately. We can 
observe a robust positive correlation between investment and delayed potential output 
growth, that furthermore is replicated for almost all countries taken individually (the only 
exception is Spain, for which nevertheless we only have 5 points). 
 
These correlations are of course only suggestive, but they underline the need to 
better investigate the role of investment in the determination of productivity, and not to 
focus as is too often the case, only on labour market rigidities. 
 
 
Policy Implications 
What precedes confirms the initial educated guess, that there is more than labour 
market rigidities to explain the differences in potential growth that we observed in the past 
15 years. Investment, both public and private, seems to play a very important role. But if 
we shift the emphasis to investment, then we need to look at the determinants of it, among 
which policy plays a crucial role. I already pointed out above the striking difference in 
terms of actual and potential growth between the UK, which followed a fiscal rule that 
preserves public investment, and the large continental countries that were bound by the 
Stability Pact. 
But also monetary policy is an important determinant of investment. The emphasis 
on price stabilization in this respect is usually justified by two main arguments. The first is 
that a stable macroeconomic environment keeps the risk down and hence is favourable to 
investment. The second argument is that at any rate, the main determinant of investment 
behaviour is the flexibility of labour and goods markets; as a consequence, the key to 
increased competitiveness is the implementation of structural reforms. 
Nevertheless, comparing the recent history of the US and the EU, we can tell a 
rather different story, in which monetary policy, investment and its long term effects on 
productivity play a central role. In the first half of the 1990s real interest rates were much 
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higher in Europe than in the US4, and that was a major determinant in the difference of 
private investment rates5 in the two zones, that continued all along the 1990s. The high 
investment rates (among other things in R&D) had the effect of increasing the stock of 
both physical and human capital in the US. As a consequence of the different stock of 
capital, the period of relatively high growth that Europe experienced between 1997 and 
2000 was particularly rich in employment, but productivity did not increase substantially. 
It was a “prductivityless” recovery! On the other hand, in the US, the productivity 
component of growth was relatively more important than job creation. In fact, it was only 
the exceptional growth rate that allowed the US to create jobs in a period of exploding 
labour productivity.  
The early 2000s, give us further indications of the link between growth, investment 
and productivity. Investment dropped significantly in the US, after the boom of the late 
1990s; the recovery after the short recession of 2000-2001 was mainly due to resilient 
consumer spending. Nevertheless, productivity continued to increase, and as a 
consequence, the US is experiencing a period of “jobless growth”. This allows concluding 
that the long term effect of investment on productivity is crucial, as the current 
productivity increase clearly build on past investment. 
This perspective on the recent macroeconomic developments in the US and in 
Europe highlights - in disagreement with the ECB -  the role that the budgetary and 
monetary tightening experienced in the EU since the early 1990s have played to depress 
investment, and hence productivity growth. 
 
Increasing productivity and potential growth necessarily requires strong investment, 
both public and private, in order to build the necessary human and physical capital stock. 
Crucial to this increase in investment is a friendly environment, in which policy necessarily 
plays a role, as the experience of the US clearly shows. 
                                                 
4 From 1990 to 1996 the short term nominal rate in the US was below 5%, while it was at around 8% in 
the European countries, while inflation was more or less the same. 
5 As I mentioned already, the insufficient private investment was accompanied by a decrease of public 
investment due to the budgetary restrictions implied by the run up to the Euro. 
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Figure 1 - Productivity Index
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Figure 2 - Yearly Average Increase in Productivity
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Figure 3 - Yearly Average Increase in Private Capital Stock
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Figure 4 - Yearly Average Government Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation
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Figure 5 - Investment and Productivity
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Figure 6 - Investment, Productivity and Potential Output
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Figure 7 - Investment and Potential Output Growth
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Figure 8 - Investment and Potential Output Growth
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